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Brain Fingerprinting Testing in the case of Harrington v.
State Thomas H. Makeig, counsel to Dr. Lawrence A. Farwell1
In Harrington v.
State, Case No. PCCV 073247(Iowa District Court for Pattawattamie County),
decided March 5, 2001, petitioner Terry Harrington sought to overturn a 1978
murder conviction on several grounds, including an allegation that newly
discovered evidence in the form of Farwell Brain Fingerprinting®
entitled him to a new trial.
Standard of review. To obtain relief, the petitioner had to show
that the newly discovered evidence was unavailable at the original trial, and
that the new evidence, if introduced at the trial, would probably change the
verdict. Additionally, in view of the
fact that the proffered evidence consisted of a novel forensic application of
psycho-physiological research methods, the court was required to determine
whether this scientific evidence was sufficiently reliable to merit admission
into evidence and, if admitted, whether the weight of the scientific evidence
was sufficiently compelling to change the verdict. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence is a showing of reliability based on (1) whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential rate of error, and whether there are standards controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (construing Federal Rule of Evidence 702). The Iowa Supreme Court has not formally endorsed this federal evidentiary standard, but it has consistently used the Daubert factors in assessing the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. See, e.g., Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997).
Description of Brain
Fingerprinting.
Farwell Brain Fingerprinting is a real-time psycho-physiological
assessment of a subject’s response to stimuli in the form of words or pictures
presented on a computer monitor. As a
forensic method, the test assesses the subject’s knowledge of a crime scene or
of the instrumentalities or fruits of a crime, and it can also be used to
assess knowledge of the particulars of an alibi scene or sequence of
events.
Brain Fingerprinting
uses electroencephalography to measure evoked potentials, known as the P300
(electrical events beginning 300 milliseconds after exposure to a stimulus),
that are characteristic of the information processing that accompanies
recognition of stimuli in comparison to a remembered context. Dr. Farwell has extended the analysis of
this evoked potential further in time to take account of additional information
that has not been analyzed hitherto, and he refers to this extension of the
P300 as a “MERMER” (“memory and encoding related multifaceted
electroencephalographic response”).
Just as a personal computer emits a characteristic sound whenever its
central processing unit is transferring information from or to the hard drive,
the human brain emits a characteristic P300 (and MERMER) electrical response
whenever the subject responds to a stimulus by updating his memory context to
take account of the stimulus. The
P300/MERMER response is not evoked when the stimulus is irrelevant to the
subject’s memory context.
Accordingly, if the
person is a witness to or perpetrator of the crime, his response to stimuli
that betray accurate details of the crime (“probes”) will evoke a P300/MERMER
response. Other items known to the
person regardless of whether he was present at the crime (“targets”) also evoke
the response and permit the tester to establish a baseline from which to
compare the person’s responses to the probes.
Other stimuli that have no relevance either to the crime or to anything
in the subject’s memory (“irrelevants”), establish a baseline for a flat response
(no P300/MERMER evoked). The signals obtained
from the subject’s response to multiple presentations of approximately one
dozen each of probes and targets, and twice as many irrelevants, are averaged
using analytical tools that are standard in the field of
electroencephalographic psycho-physiology, so that an overall result is
obtained, demonstrating whether the probes have evoked a P300/MERMER
recognition response or a flat non-recognition response.
A similar test can be
administered to probe the subject’s alibi defense; however, in the case of an
alibi, all that can usually be determined is whether the alibi story has
validity as the subject’s remembered experience: it is not usually possible to
determine whether the exact timing of the alibi experience places the subject
away from the crime scene at the time of the crime.
Brain Fingerprinting,
using standard P300 analysis, typically yields an “information present” or
“information absent” result with a statistical confidence in excess of 95% (and
usually higher than 99%), and Dr. Farwell is able to increase the confidence
factor when utilizing the additional signal information contained in the
MERMER. In research trials, Brain
Fingerprinting has a track record of more than 150 correct determinations of
“information present” or “information absent,” and no incorrect results,
although this degree of accuracy is achieved partly by calibrating the test’s
analytical methods to return an indeterminate result, with no commitment to
“information present” or “information absent,” in about 3% of cases.
The availability of
fresh and detailed probes is essential to the efficacy of the test. Indeed, it has been anticipated that, once
the reliability of the science underlying Brain Fingerprinting is established,
the principal line of attack for parties opposing the use of a Brain
Fingerprinting test result in a trial will be to challenge the evidentiary
value of the specific probes that have been employed. Dr. Farwell acknowledges that Brain Fingerprinting cannot be
successfully applied in cases where the subject has been exposed to all the
known details of the crime scene, fruits and instrumentalities, so that he will
probably return an “information present” or an indeterminate result to any
probes that are offered.
The Brain
Fingerprinting assessment of Harrington. In the Harrington case, Dr. Farwell
developed a series of probes for the crime scene, and a separate series of
probes for the petitioner’s alibi, from previously undisclosed police files. Dr. Farwell administered the test to
Harrington in May 2000 and, in October 2000, he rendered a report to the Iowa
District Court analyzing the MERMER responses.
Dr. Farwell supplemented the report with a separate analysis based
solely on P300 signals on November 10, 2000.
Both analyses produced a result of “information absent” regarding the
crime scene probes and “information present” regarding the alibi probes, with a
high degree of statistical confidence (over 99%).
Proceedings in the
Iowa District Court.
The District Court held a one-day hearing on the Brain Fingerprinting
evidence on November 14, 2000. The
court took preliminary testimony on Dr. Farwell’s credentials, the efficacy of
the test and the reliability of the underlying science. The court also examined the test results,
subject to a later determination whether this scientific evidence was
sufficiently reliable to be admissible.
At the November 14
session, Dr. Farwell testified and was cross-examined on the basis of his test
reports. Additionally, two other
psycho-physiologists with expertise in electroencephalography, Prof. William
Iacono of the University of Minnesota and Prof. Emanuel Donchin of the
University of Illinois at Champaign/Urbana, testified on Dr. Farwell’s
credentials, his test reports and the science underlying the Brain
Fingerprinting test. Prof. Iacono
testified at Harrington’s request, and Prof. Donchin was called by the
state.
Both experts validated
the science underlying Brain Fingerprinting and acknowledged Dr. Farwell’s
credentials; however, while Prof. Iacono validated the forensic application of
P300 science based on his own research, Dr. Donchin asserted that the tester’s
selection and presentation of the specific probes is the point at which science
ends and art begins. The District Court’s ruling. After briefs were submitted and other, unrelated grounds for post-conviction relief were tried, District Judge Timothy O’Grady issued his ruling on March 5, 2001. The court determined that Brain Fingerprinting was new evidence not available at the original trial, and that it was sufficiently reliable to merit admission of the evidence;2 however, the court did not regard its weight as sufficiently compelling in light of the record as a whole as meeting its exacting standard, and thus it denied a new trial on this and the other grounds asserted by Harrington. The court stated the following:
“In the spring of 2000, Harrington was given a test by Dr. Lawrence Farwell. The test is based on a ‘P300 effect’.”
“The P-300 effect has been recognized for nearly twenty years.”
“The P-300 effect has been subject to testing and peer review in the scientific community.”
“The consensus in the community of psycho-physiologists is that the P300 effect is valid.”
“The evidence resulting from Harrington's ‘Brain Fingerprinting test was discovered after the verdict. It is newly discovered.”
Appeal. Harrington has filed a notice of appeal to
the Iowa Supreme Court. The appellate
court will determine whether to uphold the trial court’s gatekeeping
determination that the Brain Fingerprinting evidence is sufficiently reliable
to merit its reception into evidence.
The Iowa Supreme Court will also determine whether to defer to the
District Court’s determination that, in light of the record as a whole, the
Brain Fingerprinting evidence fails to discredit the verdict of the original
trial, and it will review the other grounds asserted in support of Harrington’s
petition for a new trial.
Conclusion. Dr. Farwell is pleased that the first trial
court to perform the gatekeeping function in regard to Brain Fingerprinting has
determined the test to be sufficiently reliable to merit admission into
evidence. This is an achievement that
has consistently eluded every form of polygraphy for decades, and it is based
on a common perception in the relevant scientific community that P300 science,
and the statistical tools used to analyze its results, are well accepted.
Regarding Dr.
Donchin’s contention that the selection of probes in Brain Fingerprinting is
the end of science and the beginning of art, Dr. Farwell agrees that the
selection of probes is a subjective element of the test; however, he asserts
that this subjective element is the kind of evidence that judges and juries are
competent to evaluate: A non-scientist
is well equipped with common sense and life experience to evaluate all the
facts and circumstances of the case and determine whether a finding that the
specific probes in question returned a scientific result of “information
present” or “information absent” helps to establish the subject’s guilt.
Although the district
court did not find that the probes developed for the Harrington test
constituted a compelling impeachment of the verdict, we believe that Brain
Fingerprinting test results will have a substantial impact on juries, both in
cases where the test helps to exonerate the subject and in cases where it
reveals his guilt. [1] Thomas H. Makeig, P.C., Law Office, 500 North Third Street, Suite 213, P.O. Box 931, Fairfield, Iowa 52556. Telephone: (641) 472-2235; fax: (641) 472-6347; email: Tmakeig@iowabar.org. [2] The court admitted only Dr. Farwell’s P300 analysis, and not the MERMER-based analysis, on grounds that the MERMER analysis had not been subjected to sufficient peer review and publication. A paper by Drs. Farwell and Smith on the MERMER has subsequently been published in a leading forensic science journal. |